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may not derail Bowman’s narrative directions, but it is our business to ask
whether and how they might. And in any case, we would do well to compare parallel and divergent tracks en route to better understandings of the
demands and expectations for our own (political, religious, historiographic, lexicographic) Mormon Moment.

David Walker is assistant professor of religious studies at UC Santa Barbara. His “Transporting Mormonism: Railroads and Religious Sensation
in the American West,” in Sensational Religion: Sensory Cultures in Material Practice, ed. Sally M. Promey (New Haven: Yale University Press,
forthcoming 2014), treats railroad companies’ inﬂuence on popular understandings of Mormonism.

Review of Adam S. Miller. Speculative Grace: Bruno Latour and ObjectOriented Theology. New York: Fordham University Press, 2013. 160 pp.
$75.00 hardcover.
Reviewed by Stephen H. Webb
Traditionally speaking, metaphysics, at least in a form that has been useful for Christian theology, has been synonymous with the Platonic conception of a hierarchically ordered cosmos. In this view, the world is
arranged in interlocking levels of reality that correspond to qualitatively
different kinds of experience. Knowledge is the outcome of a journey
into intangible universals that turn out to shine with more lucidity than
the phenomena given to our perception. The more one penetrates the
real, the less physical it becomes—and the same can be said about us.
Our souls are as light as the divine, which suggests a shared substance or
original unity. Reason’s labor provides a measure of how far we have
fallen, just as reason’s attainment is an indication of how far we may yet
rise. The virtues, which discipline our recalcitrant bodies, clear the path
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back that reason must follow. Perception has its role, since desire moves
the will, but only the unexpected harmonies of beauty can awaken the
soul’s yearning for a peace that fulﬁlls all understanding. On the assumption that the internal concord of the soul should reﬂect the unfettered
splendor of the divine, great cultures have been built. The true, the good,
and the beautiful are one above just as they should become united for individuals and societies alike.
For much of Western history, this metaphysical scheme was inseparable from cosmological speculations, thanks to the central role played
by Plato’s Timaeus. Night’s darkness revealed the brilliance of the stars,
and the wise ones assumed that their light was meant for us to see. However elaborately articulated, this was the common sense of the Christian
worldview. The gradations of truth corresponded to a cosmic topography. Philosophy scaled a ladder that was at once physical and spiritual.
True, the spiritual was immaterial, but it carried enough weight to uphold
the education of our senses and the redirection of our desires.
This venture took a radically different turn in the Renaissance, when
the mathematization of observation began the homogenization of ontology. Knowledge was still a matter of idealization, but the process of abstraction was completely different from the realization of universals.
Abstract concepts have a formal power that belies the personally transformative demands of universal truths. Modernity thus witnessed the loss
of knowledge’s metaphysical depth as facts replaced types and the goal of
inquiry bent downward to immanence rather than upward toward transcendence. Morality became another object to study rather than the prerequisite for all inquiry, and beauty, severed from the question of truth,
became just another word for entertainment. The more inﬁnite the cosmos became, the more ﬂat was the world. Stripped of its layers of meaning,
nature was forced to submit to the intrusive methodologies of technical
expertise, not the plaintive queries of the lovers of wisdom.
Even after the intellectual revolutions that severed wisdom from the
evidence of the senses, however, Platonic metaphysics continued to prosper as it took an inward turn. If truth was no longer crowned by the beckoning shapes of perfect spheres, one could always turn within to discover
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inﬁnite intensities of spiritual depth. Only atheists denied that this world
is but a shadow cast by the brightness of a greater truth.
Nonetheless, with no cosmic light to mirror, the soul proved to be
too muddled to inspire endless reﬂection. Metaphysics ﬂoundered in
these shallow waters, with some philosophers applying the practical advantages of science to old philosophical topics while others tried to refurbish bits and pieces of the Platonic project like collectibles salvaged
from a long abandoned warehouse. Theology too lost direction. The disconnection of the spiritual from the material left faith appealing to the
sheer fact of revelation—and it did not matter whether that authority was
located in the Bible or the church—or it turned religion into an instrument of moral inspiration and social improvement.
Grace, in the old scheme, was a matter of the higher making room
for the lower (and in Christianity, it was a matter of the highest making
room for the lowest). But now space, whether its expansion is inﬁnite or
cyclical, is void of depth even amidst its multiplying dimensions, and
thus our material world no longer gives us the coordinates for distinguishing a vertical ascent from a horizontal maze.
We are surely not done with being Platonic, but we do need a new
metaphysics to respond to new cosmologies, and Adam Miller has found
one. His very important book is both a splendid introduction to the
thought of the French philosopher Bruno Latour and a provocative and
original reﬂection on the possibilities for grace in an age of metaphysical
materialism. I think it is right to identify Latour (and Miller) as metaphysical materialists, even though they are developing a nonstandard interpretation of matter that does away with its usual connotations as well as
its philosophical lineage, but more on that below.
Miller pursues two questions. What if objects are all that we have? If
so, is there room in a world of things for something as lacking in objectivity as grace? These two questions are separable, so I will ﬁrst describe
Miller’s interpretation of Latour’s thought and then comment on his attempt to ﬁnd a place for grace in this new metaphysical terrain.
For Latour (and Miller throughout this book adopts Latour’s views
as his own), classical metaphysics is, in Miller’s word, conspiratorial. It
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is always on the search for a fundamental unity lurking behind the observable course of scattered events. From this perspective, all metaphysics
is reductionistic, even if the reality it seeks is “higher” instead of “lower”
than the available phenomena. Religion too is reductionistic—as are all
attempts to prove religion illusory. Conspiracy theories are dependent
on the metaphysics of invisible forces, while a metaphysics of objects—
this is Miller’s wager—forces us to take things as they are.
The only solution to reductionism is to liberate all objects from every
attempt to fold them into a single interpretive scheme. Latour calls this
the principle or irreduction. This principle does not mean that reductions
are not useful. On the contrary, everything can be reduced, deduced, and
aligned with everything else. Irreduction is as impossible as reduction
because objects are inﬁnitely divisible and compoundable, which is another way of saying that nothing in the world is one (united, whole, or
complete). Miller explains this by saying that objects are both resistant
and available. They are always available for reduction, but even when
they are reduced, they leave a remainder (that is available for other
groupings or constructs).
Latour’s metaphysics is experimental (which does not actually tell us
much, since Latour, according to Miller, thinks “a good experiment is a
bit of theater,” p. 114). Its conclusions are provisional and its method is
slow and easygoing as it resists any rush to ontological judgments. It consists, nonetheless, of many axioms and gnomic statements, like the following (from Latour): “There are more of us than we thought” (p. 15).
This is, perhaps, what Leibniz’s Monadology would look like had it been
written by a polytheist, or written with a Husserlian turn to the things
themselves without all of the fuss about states of intentional consciousness. In Miller’s words, “Rather than axiomatizing the One, he axiomatizes the many” (p. 15). The result is a decidedly ﬂat world with no levels
of being and none of the corresponding variations in intensity of experience. Miller argues that this prevents objects themselves from being
ﬂattened by the predeterminations of “deep” metaphysical systems.
Politically speaking, Latour’s leveled landscape is decidedly democratic. “To be an object,” Miller explains, “is to be a politician” (p. 20).
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With no conspiracies to chart and no scapegoats to blame, everyone must
engage in the small compromises and adjustments that constitute modern liberal democracies. The only thing stopping objects from acting like
a mob is their sheer proliferation. Latour grants objects a certain kind of
agency, but this is not an experiment in panpsychism, which is one of
the major differences between Latour and Alfred North Whitehead. It
almost seems as if Latour projects agency onto objects because he leaves
so little room for extra-objective forces that can move objects around.
Matter for Latour is not to be confused with “nature.” Nature is an organic
whole that ﬁnds its meaning when contrasted with a height or depth that
borders and attempts to tame its wildness. Objects are not natural any
more than they are supernatural. They are also not subjected to the dualism of form and substance (although he treats form as the way in which
objects are used and matter as the source of each object’s resistance to
such use, which is a pragmatic updating of metaphysic’s oldest division).
Since they are agents, and very weak agents at that, they give themselves
a variety of forms and assume many guises without ever being a single
identiﬁable form that can be discerned by rational understanding. This
seems to me like a modern version of Scotus’s doctrine of the plurality
of substantial forms. (Miller also accepts and radicalizes Scotus’s univocal
treatment of language about God.)
One of the challenges in thinking about Latour is that he works so
hard to overcome every traditional dualism. He is, for example, neither
a realist nor a constructionist, nor is he some mixture of the two. His
train of thought is conjunctive. Epistemology is ontology, the nonhuman
is human, the one is multiple, and so on. Everything is something else
and never just itself, even though the goal of phenomenology is to allow
objects “to speak on their own behalf ” (p. 125).
Latour maps his position not only by scattering unsystematic axioms
but also by asserting redeﬁnitions of ordinary words. Representation is
translation, causation is fulcrum, transcendence is fermentation, and reality is deﬁned by troublemaking and recalcitrance. The nomenclature is
almost intentionally arbitrary. “That which layers and forms processions
I will call angel,” Latour writes, “in contrast to that which aligns and maintains networks, which I call instrument” (p. 126). Thus does objectivism
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slide into nominalism when words themselves become nothing more
than objects.
The world is a mess, and so is our knowledge of it. Indeed, our lack
of knowledge of things evidently corresponds to their lack of unity. Latour is a realist of the unreal. This can sound awfully banal at times. “An
object’s situation,” Miller writes, “is always composed of ramifying complexities” (p. 56). Miller seems happy with the resulting relativism. “In
an object-oriented metaphysics,” he admits, “the truthfulness of a statement depends solely on the number of relevant agents persuaded to lineup behind it” (p. 103). If everyone reading this review were to vote on
that statement, I am conﬁdent we would invalidate it.
As for God, well, “if God exists, he is no metaphysical king” (p. 19).
God too must be a politician, cajoling and compromising in order to get
anything done. Absent any sovereign, intentions are advanced only
through committees that have little power, just as in the modern academy! Miller follows the noted Mormon philosopher James Faulconer in
resituating the verticality of transcendence on a horizontal plane. Transcendence is everywhere; there are no privileged objects, as with Martin
Heidegger’s ﬁxation with Vincent van Gogh’s painting of a pair of old,
worn-out shoes. In fact, this view of objects presupposes the eternity of
matter (see p. 32), and not just any old eternity of matter. Matter is not
eternally chaotic but eternally formed, so that there are no original forms
or a ﬁrst former of all that exists; there are only eternally mutable objects
that pass through the ﬂux of this and that in ways that defy a stable rational analysis.
Where does grace ﬁt in? Grace is the most subtle of theological
terms, a word that conveys something of the ethereal and evanescent,
crisscrossing between the otherworldly and the mundane. It is that aspect of God’s nature that works in us to bring about our participation
in him. Force, energy, and light provide the network of images and ideas
that are most naturally drawn to the experience of grace. Grace is relational, pervasive, and personal. As pure gift and thus unexpected event,
it never congeals into a stable concept. Whatever it is, it is not an object.
Indeed, the cardinal rule about grace in Christian theology could be
this: Thou shalt not turn grace into an object. It is not something that
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can be manipulated, even when, in High Church traditions, it is conveyed through tangible symbols or physical relics. When grace is objectiﬁed, it becomes its opposite, a dark desire for mastery that seeks to take
the place of God. To handle it is to destroy it. At least that is the traditional, Protestant-inspired view of grace that even many Catholics have
bought into today. This book—which asks the question, “What happens
when we suspend our knowledge of what force is?” (p. 37)—helps us to
see how very wrong everything about that view is, as well as how hard it
is going to be to replace it.
I was prepared to love this book because of my sense of how Catholic
Latour’s metaphysics is (confession: I am Roman Catholic). I wanted to
see how Miller would rethink grace absent the fear of rendering it empirical and demonstrable. The heirs of the Protestant Reformation, albeit
against the intentions of the Reformers, turned grace into a forensic
event—a singular divine judgment that can be accepted by individuals
at any time, as long as they plead guilty and promise to change their ways.
Grace thus happens only in the cross for God and in the head for us. It
is not mediated by objects, and it has no earthly weight or visible reality.
It is certainly not a substance! It does not denote a change in the divine,
and it actually does not change anything in us. We remain sinners, but
by acknowledging our guilt, we become free of the punishment we so
rightly deserve. Grace so construed always happens somewhere between
us and God and never here and now.
When Miller speaks about grace, he has two voices. One is in tune
with the Catholic sacramental imagination. For example, he is drawn to
grace that is downsized, reduced from “large-scale forces of cosmic
progress” to micro-movements of adjustments and supplementations (p.
3). That brief comment promises to take an object-oriented view of grace
in new and exciting directions. Grace for Miller forces us to confront the
obstinate reality of things. It brings the world closer, which is the exact
opposite of science, which makes the world go away (vanishing in abstract mathematical formulas). “Science,” he writes, “corrects for our
nearsightedness, religion for our farsightedness” (p. 119). Science, from
this perspective, is much more miraculous and unbelievable than religion. Grace itself is a kind of object that gets in the way of our attempts
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to order the objects that pass through our lives. If thought of as a force,
it would be a very weak force, competing for our attention, unable to
move anything on its own. “Religion aims at illuminating objects that are
too near rather than too far” (p. 126). Grace is a form of attention that
keeps us focused and blocks our efforts to escape from the real.
That is what Miller sounds like when he is being Catholic, and I want
to hear much more. But there is another voice he assumes, and it speaks
in the Protestant language of a judgment that extends inﬁnitely beyond
what is necessary and required. Updated for postmodern sensitivities,
this is the language of excess—of a purely rhetorical realm that transcends the ordinary and everyday. Miller thus writes that grace is “prodigal in that it is in excess of what is deserved or expected” (p. 78). So
understood, grace is “passively received rather than actively controlled”
(p. 79), a statement that reiterates the Protestant claim that grace must
be either freely given or laboriously earned with no in-between. When
he is being Protestant, Miller says very simply that grace “is free and unconditioned” (p. 79). It is the opposite of objects because it does not need
to enter into the economy of exchange and negotiation. It cannot be contracted. It begins where objects disappear.
Perhaps the problem in applying Latour to grace lies more with Latour than Miller himself. If the psychological malaise that haunts traditional metaphysics is paranoia—the sense that there is a power behind
the scene controlling everything—the corresponding malady of Latour’s
object-oriented system is schizophrenia—an inability to make coherent
causal connections. (Latour calls the attempt to create commensurable relationships among objects “stacking,” p. 56.) There are no universals for
Latour, but there are networks and associations. Latour’s objects, like people in today’s world, have no lasting loyalties or deep commitments to enduring identities. Instead, they hook up in relationships of convenience
and mutual satisfaction. This is a philosophy that could only be written
from and for the modern secular university, with its aﬃrmation of disjointed areas of study, its painful inability to forge a substantive identity,
and its methodological atheism. Miller talks about suffering, but that discussion is tangential at best to his theory of objects. In fact, his thoughts
about suffering (as opposed to pain!) appeal to the category of depth that

https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/msr2/vol1/iss1/19

8

Webb: Adam S. Miller, <em>Speculative Grace: Bruno Latour and Object-Or
182 Mormon Studies Review

he otherwise disavows. Besides, a graceful account of objects should be
playful, but when Miller talks grace, he is all somber and serious.
I didn’t fall in love with this book, but it did end up making me hope
that in his future books, Latour decreases and Miller increases. There was
great promise in Miller’s previous work, Rube Goldberg Machines: Essays
in Mormon Theology (2012), but this book is not the payoff. Instead, it is
more promises. We need a materialistic metaphysics for a variety of reasons, even though I am not sure that Americans need to be persuaded to
spend more time getting closer to objects, but I trust Miller’s promising
work, more than Latour’s, to lead us there.
Stephen H. Webb, who earned his PhD from the University of Chicago,
taught religion and philosophy for twenty-ﬁve years at Wabash College.
His most recent book is Mormon Christianity: What Other Christians
Can Learn from the Latter-day Saints (Oxford University Press, 2013),
and he is working on a book, with Alonzo Gaskill, on Mormon–Roman
Catholic dialogue.

Review of Stephen H. Webb. Jesus Christ, Eternal God: Heavenly Flesh
and the Metaphysics of Matter. New York: Oxford University Press, 2012.
343 pp. $70.00 hardcover.
Reviewed by Adam S. Miller
“The word matter is, in philosophy, the name of a problem.”
—Bertrand Russell
The superstructure of practices and beliefs in which Mormons pray, serve,
and live is pretty well deﬁned. But this system, for good and bad, is free
ﬂoating. Mormon beliefs have an internal coherence that gives their
meaning a pragmatic stability, but the system as a whole isn’t tethered to
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